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I have taken the title of this panel, the "Overview Panel", to heart
and will attempt to provide some thoughts on a somewhat broader
basis, rather than looking at the specifics of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act or the Uruguay Round negotiations. It has been
a challenge to consider issues in a context which is greater in scope
than the completion of the Uruguay Round negotiations, particularly
because these negotiations are currently the focus of such attention.
I would like to begin these comments today, however, with some
thoughts on current U.S. trade policies and statutes and the related
regulation at the GATT level, as a background for moving into the
issues of services and intellectual property.
From my perspective, we should not be satisfied that the declining
dollar, breakthroughs on long simmering trade irritants and the pas-
sage of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act have eliminated
tensions generated by years of enormous trade imbalances. When it
comes to the actual trade disputes, petitions for U.S. import relief
undoubtedly contribute to bilateral and multilateral tensions, and the
fact is that American business feels perfectly justified in filing a
steady stream of complaints against any nation it feels is engaging
in unfair trade practices. Therefore, it is important to examine the
thinking behind these "unfair" trade petitions.
In the United States, there are two basic structures for dealing
with trade complaints. The first is the rule-oriented system of settling
trade disputes. Under this system, problems are resolved within the
framework of legal standards. The second structure utilizes the po-
litical system. Relief can be sought from either the Congress or the
executive branch.
Fairness plays a major role in the first structure. To the American
mind it is "fair" if there is an understood set of rules and everyone
has the same chance to play by them. If the rule is not right then
an effort can be made to change it, but until it is changed, everyone
must adhere to the rule. This is a concept American lawyers can
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understand. This rule-of-law system is designed to produce certainty
of results. When complaints allege unfair competition, the relevant
statutes require investigation, with less room for political influence.
Experts, evidence, data, analyses and lawyers play significant roles.
The U.S. International Trade Commission ("ITC") is the chief
example of the rule-oriented approach to settling trade disputes. The
ITC, an independent agency of the U.S. Government, is often referred
to as the shield of Congress-an instrument that makes possible a
swift, non-political resolution of trade problems that would be dif-
ficult for an elected body to resolve. All industries and countries,
large and small, may have their day in court before the ITC. With
the ITC anchoring the system, there is a reliance on expert opinion-
the "how and when" to proceed is understood by all participants.
Most ITC investigations involve alleged unfair competition from
subsidized or dumped imports. Complaints are filed under anti-dump-
ing and countervailing duty statutes (Title VII of the Tariff Act of
1930).' Since 1979, the statutes governing both types of investigation
have included a "material injury" test for the imposition of dumping
duties by signatories to the Tokyo Round Codes of the GATT. As
we know, the subsidized or dumped imports are themselves not illegal.
It is only when a resulting material injury to U.S. industry can be
shown that the duty applied. The duty is not intended to be punitive;
rather, it is calculated to remove any future unfair advantage.
Implicit in this concept of fairness in the law is the notion that
American workers and businesses should compete on the basis of
comparative advantage-that they should not have to adjust to un-
fairly traded goods. Consumers are expected to forego the savings
resulting from dumping or subsidies in the interests of the domestic
producers of the product; a duty is applied when the petitioner can
demonstrate that it is being materially injured. Thus, the material
injury test operates as an effective compromise between diverging
points of view by accommodating the concern for the welfare of
workers and producers in the affected U.S. industry in a manner
that minimizes the disruption of commerce, and by attempting to
maximize value to the consumer.
Fairness also plays a major role in the U.S. protection of intellectual
property-ownership conferring, under section 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930,2 the right to possess, use or dispose of products and processes
1. The Tariff Act of 1930 is codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1677k (1988).
2. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
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created by human ingenuity. Section 337 cases encompass a wide
variety of intellectual property-related causes of action, such as patent,
trademark, or copyright infringement, passing off, and misappro-
priation of trade secrets. If the ITC determines that imports are
violating the intellectual property rights of a U.S. industry, the ITC
may issue cease and desist or exclusion orders on the infringing
imports.
The original intent of Section 337 was to protect, and consequently
encourage, American production, jobs and capital from unfair import
competition. Given the changes to Section 337 that were made in the
Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, the law has become less of a trade law
and more a type of law aimed at preventing violations of intellectual
property rights. Nevertheless, if the ITC finds a violation and fashions
a remedy, it still must consider public interest factors, which in some
cases, might outweigh the need for relief. I have not covered in these
remarks the effect of the recent GATT panel report in the AKZO
case concerning Section 337, but this report certainly puts that statute
squarely onto the negotiating table of the intellectual property arena
for the rest of the Uruguay Round. I might add to the extent that
I have seen the public reporting of the panel it is what was clearly
anticipated by a note in the Georgia Journal of International Com-
parative Law of last year which won the Dean Rusk Award here at
the law school.3
Historically, the United States has enacted trade legisaltion, not
competitiveness legislation. While the United States has worked to
liberalize international commerce, it is also a fact that the United
States has created exemptions or shelters for declining or politically
powerful domestic industries. In the process, the so-called fairness
laws have sometimes been manipulated by practitioners in pursuit of
the immediate interests of their, clients so as to distort the laws'
original purpose. Consequently, U.S. protection against imports -
whether or not they were unfairly traded-soared in coverage from
80 of imports in 1975 to 22076 in 1986. Unfortunately, the protection
afforded, usually in the form of tariffs or quotas, has fallen short
of the intended goal of making beneficiaries more independently
competitive. Indeed, much of the recent productivity gains in U.S.
manufacturing has been in industries hit hardest by foreign compe-
tition. Average productivity gains in sectors without foreign com-
3. SECTION 337 AND THE GATT: A NECESSARY PROTECTION OR AN UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICE?, 17 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 47 (1988).
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petition were only 2% during this period, while sectors facing
competition from abroad posted gains between 7 and 8%. Clearly,
if the U.S. is to regain its competitiveness, it needs a government
demanding change from its domestic industries, not simply protecting
them against it.
United States industry is facing fundamental competitiveness prob-
lems that will not be resolved merely by passing trade laws, nor even
by a depreciated dollar. Low-wage competition, particularly from
Southeast Asian nations, has hit a broad section of U.S. manufac-
turers very hard. Inadequate investment and management practices
have also hurt American competitiveness. American's trade relations
with Japan illustrate this point.
The productivity performance of U.S. industry is disappointing
compared to that of industry in Japan. Thus, even a further fall in
the dollar and a removal of import barriers in Japan would still likely
leave the United States with a continuing problem in its ability to
compete with Japanese businesses, either in the United States or in
Japan. That is to say, in addition to structural micro-economic trade
problems, there are broader macro problems which the GATT simply
does not reach. What, then, can the world trade system and the legal
mechanisms for its regulation do to adjust to the increasing pace of
internationalization of world commerce?
While some important reforms of the GATT system are on the
table for the Uruguay Round, I would like to suggest some longer-
range concepts to build political support in individual countries for
limiting unfair trade practices in those countries. The following are
sharp departures from the path that we have been following, and I
am not necessarily an advocate for these positions. I am simply trying
to outline post-Uruguay possibilities for improvement of the process.
First, in order to build broad opposition among businesses to
subsidies in their own countries, we should impose some costs on
the business community in each country where subsidies exist. For
example, if country X countervails against the subsidy of country Y,
country Y should be able to go to a GATT panel and and have the
panel determine whether country X, the original countervailing coun-
try, is in substantial compliance with the Subsidy Code, regardless
of the products benefitting from country X's subsidies. If the GATT
panel concludes that country X is not in substantial compliance, then
country Y could ask for compensation for country X's original coun-
tervailing duty action. Eventually, in order to eliminate any liability
to pay compensation, when aggrieved industries successfully convince
their government to countervail against subsidized imports, other
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industries in the country would have an incentive to lobby for the
elimination of subsidies at home.
A second, and even more radical solution, would be to eliminate
dumping and countervailing duty laws altogether. The European com-
munity has done so between its member states; Canada and the
United States could move in that direction in the U.S./ Canada Free-
Trade Agreement. The working group on subsidies under the Free
Trade Agreement could be one of the most important discussions
being held over the next few years in the international trade area.
The truth is that the average American businessperson cares much
less about prices of his foreign competitor in the foreign market or
whether his foreign competition receives government aid. Instead, the
U.S. business person continues to be most worried about prices and
competition in the United States. Thus, the anti-dumping and coun-
tervailing duty laws have little foundation in the daily lives of the
injured parties and often lead the parties down an expensive, time
consuming, and often unpredictable path. Because the Title VII laws
are intended to exclude only unfair trade, the United States tends to
label all trade that it excludes as unfair, whether or not the appellation
is warranted. The United States might better promote its own interests
and provoke less foreign resentment if it stopped wrapping itself in
the flag of "fair trade."
A third reform would be to make it less burdensome for countries
to use the "escape clause" mechanism, 4 which permits import relief
even in the absence of unfair trade practices. This could help to shift
the focus from the fixation on the unfair nature of import problems.
Like the first proposal, it would require a new type of GATT panel.
This panel would examine adjustment plans for industries receiving
escape clause relief. If the panel finds the adjustment plan adequate
to resolve the problems that it addresses, then there would not be a
requirement for the country utilizing import relief under the escape
clause to give compensation to its affected trade partners. This would
reward appropriate, efficient use of the escape clause.
Even if these more radical solutions are not explored at the GATT,
the administration of U.S. trade laws should not rely so heavily on
the "unfair trade" laws, which are beginning to lose their meaningful
place in the globalized world of commerce. Instead, Section 201 (the
4. GATT Article XIX. The U.S. escape clause measures are contained in sections
201-203 of the Trade Act of 1974, currently codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-54.
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escape clause) should be better utilized to provide industries and
workers adjustment relief to changing trade patterns.
Section 201 is an amalgam of a rule-oriented and a political ap-
proach. It provides import relief for industries adjusting to new
international competition even where there is no allegation of un-
fairness.
In sum, the United States needs to move away from this fixation
on "unfair" imports as a problem, and on import relief as a sole
solution. Instead it should use a more appropriate test to trigger
assistance, i.e., an assessment of an industry's ability to compete in
the international market. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 19881 was a first step in this direction.
In any event, as the dollar declines and U.S. firms become more
price competitive, the United States will focus less on the fairness of
imports sold in the domestic market and more on the fairness of
access for its exports to foreign markets. For example, the Super 301
and special 301 provisions in the new Trade Act will stimulate more
301 complaints.
Section 301 underscores three major themes in the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act: first Congress' desire to battle unfair trade
practices overseas; second, the shift of focus of U.S. trade policy
away from deference to diplomatic considerations and away from
complete presidential discretion; and, third, a decision to push for
export opportunities. Complaints can no longer languish on the Pres-
ident's desk. In fact, the authority to make legal determinations and
decide what is the best action to take under Section 301 is transferred
to the U.S. Trade Representative.
Meanwhile, interest in import barriers against goods, whether they
are erected at home or overseas, is giving way to interest in barriers
against services and capital, one of the reasons we are here today.
As for capital, this is a trend which will continue as long as foreigners
continue to hold American dollars, and as long as American invest-
ments remain the attractive bargains they are when denominated in
depreciated dollar terms. Foreign investment will remain a source of
trade disputes as long as Americans continue to perceive foreigners
buying up assets in the United States while the foreigners' own
domestic markets restrict similar foreign investment.
5. Pub. L 100-418, Title I, Aug. 23, 1988, 102 Stat. 1119-1324. In particular,
see Subtitles A-E of Pub. L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1119-1260.
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Looking beyond the Uruguay Round in the area of intellectual
property, we should consider a few basic realities concerning the
development of the international intellectual property system. A reality
I think we tend to lose sight of in our current movement to protect
intellectual property is that intellectual property protection costs money;
it costs government resources and it costs private sector resources in
terms of the costs of multiple searches and registrations as well as
enforcement. These costs would be significantly reduced if register-
ation for intellectual property protection were available through one
application, in the applicant's language, for the issuance of one patent,
one trademark, or one copyright world-wide. I would propose such
a system with enforcement to be handled under national law but
with a set of common standards.
Obviously this is an objective which cannot be easily obtained and
will not be reached in a single generation, so we have to begin with
some goals that will lead us in that direction. If this is a legitimate
objective, we need to make sure that those steps that we take in the
Uruguay Round and in other intellectual property forums do not
create institutional barriers to the ultimate achievement of this ob-
jective.
-A first step to consider is the harmonization of the national laws
of major countries. This would involve developing a consensus of
what should be protected and how long such protection should last.
Each major industrialized country must recognize that its current
intellectual property system has been the result of growth and change,
and, to some extent, historical accident. There are no absolutes in
the intellectual property arena. It is always a matter of balancing the
benefits of rewarding creativity and invention, by allowing a privilege
which can be used in an anti-competitive manner, against the benefits
of spreading the knowledge and providing protection and/or better
products to consumers.
The pendulum swings between these two goals and I believe that
at the present time in the United States the pendulum tends to swing
toward economic protection for the creativity of the inventor, and
for the owner of the intellectual property. There has, however, always
been an ultimate balancing between these two goals. The point is
that we should be able to negotiate a convergence of the varying
national systems that currently exist, on a basis of flexibility founded
on historical perspective as to what is and what is not protectable,
and how the former should be protected.
A second goal, which I have already mentioned and which I think
is more easily achievable, is more rapid movement toward simplified
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international filing. We already have a global system in place and
that is easily demonstrated. Every time you notice a U.S. patent in
litigation look for the equivalent foreign patents for the same product
filed by that manufacturer. However, the costs of this system, with
a few exceptions, are born on a national basis. This is of course a
boon for intellectual property lawyers, but that may not be a sufficient
policy reason to maintain the current system.
We need to consider the possibility that developing countries may
not be able to afford the types of systems we are encouraging them
to adopt. Their entire GNP may not be able to support a good search
and registration system of the type that we would look for under
our standards. Even with the search and registration system, en-
forcement in the developing world will continue to be a problem,
and one for which we should show some understanding. The courts
and police in many developing countries have other things to concern
themselves with than investigating people who are pirating tapes,
despite the fact that pirating tapes is an egregious intellectual property
offense.
One of the ways around this cost predicament may be to use the
World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") as an institution
that can run a search and registration system for developing countries
that would be willing to allow it. This system would allow filings to
be undertaken for multiple countries. The actual registration system
for a country could be run from Geneva with data flowing back to
an office in the country involved. The base fee charged for the search
and registration could pay for the system. The developing country
itself would be left with the enforcement issues, while technical as-
sistance, in terms of costs and effective enforcement mechanisms
could be provided through WIPO.
Although it is clear that significant issues are being tackled in the
GATT intellectual property negotiations, there are serious problems
with resolving international intellectual property issues through the
GATT. It is important to note, however, that significant steps can
be made there.
The types of questions I have concerning this area may best be
illustrated in the following example.
A hypothetical U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturer has a U.S. patent
on a particular product that it manufactures, say for this example,
in Korea. The product is then shipped to and copied in, let us say,
Indonesia. Who has the GATT claim? If the GATT rights are attached
to the goods, does Korea have the right to bring the claim since this
is a product produced in Korea, or does the U.S. government have
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the right to protect Korean goods because they utilized U.S. patents?
Can the U.S. government enforce those rights even over the objections
of the Korean government where the goods originated?
Another difficult area I see is the assembly of components from
various countries with each component having intellectual property
protection. There is also the question of what is adequate and effective
when inventors in different countries register the same rights at the
same time. My point is that with the trade-in-goods, or for that
matter trade-in-services, approach of the GATT there are numerous
problems that will be very difficult and will take much time to resolve.
Turning to the services area, in the context of intellectual property,
there are persons who are much more qualified than I to speak on
the substantive issues and on the status of the Uruguay Rounds.
There is, however, a long-range policy issue in terms of ultimate
objectives for trade in services that I would like to raise. Over the
past couple of years, Ambassador Clayton Yuetter was fond of
describing the U.S. position regarding agricultural subsidies in the
Uruguay Round negotiations as one that not only was on "the side
of the angels", but one that was recognized even by our opponents
as being on that side. He repeatedly pointed out that these opponents'
argument for not conceding to our position in the negotiations was
based on purely political objections. I want to be clear that I tend
to agree with now- Secretary Yuetter that with regard to the position
of the United States, all trade distorting agricultural subsidies should
be eliminated; we are on "the side of the angels" in terms of economic
theory. I do recognize, however, that like the United States' will-
ingness to accept the costs of trade distortion in the multi-fiber
arrangement due to other costs associated with too rapid a shift in
an industrial base, there are reasons that some countries have similar
reservations about too rapid a change or exposure to comparative
advantage in their agricultural sector.
Turning this idea to the services trade, there have been important
achievements in the negotiations of the GATT services agreement.
The time was past to move internationally in this area, and the private
sector in the United States led the way. I think those who are critical
of the pace of the services negotiations need to remember that the
formation of the GATT system for trade in goods and its reduction
of tariff barriers have been accomplished over 40 years. It began
with a first step and we are now taking the first steps in services.
The developing countries, however, have objections to the services
negotiations based on their coverage of "white collar" services but
not the services provided by laborers. In terms of economics, the
[Vol. 19:2
TRADE CONFERENCE
developing countries are on "the side of the angels" in this particular
argument. Our objections are really based on the obvious political
inability to reach an agreement that would allow, for example, major
construction contractors to bring Third World workers into the United
States to complete a major construction contract.
It would be my hope that the services negotiators, while reaching
an agreement as a first step in a developing international structure
for ensuring greater freedom of trade in services, will recognize that
they should not set in place an institutional structure that will prevent
or inhibit us in the future from moving in the direction that is on
"the side of the angels."
A final area of concern, on which our trade policy formulators
should keep an eye in the post-Uruguay Round future, is special and
differential treatment for developing countries. I am not concerned
about trade preferences for developing countries in the developed
countries, but I am very concerned about import substitution devices
in the developing countries that are contrary to normal GATT rules.
The justification for these import substitution provisions was the
promotion of economic development. However, I believe that the
post-war record shows that economic development is not promoted
by protection, but by liberalization that encourages the subject econ-
omy to become part of the international economy. Here I am talking
about import substitution policies that were adopted in good faith
as measures for economic development when in fact we know that
in many instances they have become nothing more than a cover for
purely protectionist purposes.
In many countries these import substitution policies have developed
their own constituencies for continued protection regardless of the
economic effect. These constituencies pushed many governments in
developing countries to argue for the continued availability under the
GATT of trade restrictive measures for developing countries. Current
economic thinking no longer supports these types of policies. A look
at those countries that have been successful in their development
policies reveals finds that those countries have followed outward
oriented trade policies, as, for example, those pursued in Singapore.
Two highly protectionist developing countries, Turkey and Mexico,
are countries that have turned around their economic development
prospects by converting their trade policies into ones of more outward
oriented development.
I would argue that it is no longer in the interest of the developing
countries to maintain special differential treatment such as the current
balance of payments waiver in the GATT system. A long-term ob-
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jective of our trade negotiators should be to not increase the dif-
ferential treatment that allows protectionist policies in the developing
countries, but instead to try to limit and reduce the scope of these
policies with the ultimate goal of encouraging all developing countries
to adopt trade liberalizing, market opening policies under the GATT
system.
Peter McPherson, the former director of AID, in making this
argument, has pointed out that some of the economic benefits from
outward oriented trade policies would include, for the developing
countries as they have for developed countries, efficiency gains from
production based on comparative advantage; economies of scale re-
sulting from production for expanded markets; lower inflation given
imports of lower-priced goods; more efficient investment which frees
capital saving for other investment; higher savings ratios; increased
employment of labor, higher wages, and more equitable income dis-
tribution; increased technological innovation; and higher growth rates.
The Uruguay Round has for the first time genuinely included the
developing countries as major negotiating partners. It is not clear,
however, that the application of GATT principals will lead to greater
economic growth in the developing world. In the Uruguay Round,
as well as in policies for post-Uruguay, the underlying principles of
GATT which are still the foundation on which trade liberalization
is founded (non discrimination, transparency, and reciprocity) should
remain our guides. Not only can the interest of the developing coun-
tries in economic development be achieved consistently with these
principles, but these countries' economic growth can be enhanced by
a world trade system that is guided by and applies these basic prin-
ciples as uniformly as is possible.
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